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The Multiple Faces of Effective Grand Strategy
Abstract
Effective national leaders throughout history have deliberately developed grand strategies
and successfully implemented them to attain their political goals, while also integrating
and accomplishing economic, social, defense, and sometimes religious objectives. Not all
leaders have been successful, however, as this process is immensely complex and can be
adversely affected by the actions of other leaders around their region and the world. It
bears examination, then, to determine what factors contribute to successful grand
strategies and why many leaders fail to reach their stated ends. This article utilizes a
historic case study approach and explores three key areas of grand strategy: universal
principles, Clausewitzian approaches, and indirect approaches. I handle each separately
and in distinct fashion, though some connective tissue does interlace across sections.
Additionally, the unifying argument is that thoughtful, rational leaders, who weigh the costs
and benefits associated with each course of action available to them, still must heed the
truths embedded in these three sections to attain their objectives. Not doing so often leads
to failure, unrealized goals, and a nation gone awry.
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The Multiple Faces of Effective
Grand Strategy
By Bryan N. Groves1

Introduction
Effective national leaders throughout history have deliberately developed
grand strategies and successfully implemented them to attain their political goals, while also integrating and accomplishing economic, social,
defense, and sometimes religious objectives. Not all leaders have been
successful, however, as this process is immensely complex and can be
adversely affected by the actions of other leaders around their region and
the world. It bears examination, then, to determine what factors contribute to successful grand strategies and why many leaders fail to reach their
stated ends. This article utilizes a historic case study approach and
explores three key areas of grand strategy: universal principles, Clausewitzian approaches, and indirect approaches. I handle each separately
and in distinct fashion, though some connective tissue does interlace
across sections. Additionally, the unifying argument is that thoughtful,
rational leaders, who weigh the costs and benefits associated with each
course of action available to them, still must heed the truths embedded in
these three sections to attain their objectives. Not doing so often leads to
failure, unrealized goals, and a nation gone awry.

Universal Principles of Flexible Grand Strategy
Grand strategy is the matching of large ends with means.2 Visionary leadership and relevant communication are two universally applicable principles of grand strategy. Leaders who employ them effectively increase their
country's likelihood of success. Polybius and Thucydides are key historical
figures who provide insight into these principles. The terminology each
used varies, but the concepts and their significance to the development
and execution of successful grand strategy does not.
Visionary leadership is the fundamental principle necessary for the implementation of an effective grand strategy. Thucydides and Polybius use
historical approaches to explain the significance of leadership to grand
strategy. In his account of Hannibal's campaign across the Alps and the
ensuing battles between his Carthaginian army and the Roman armies,
Polybius repeatedly indicates how Hannibal proactively chose the terrain
1
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on which he would have an advantage.3 Hannibal also exercised effective
leadership by balancing mission accomplishment and care for his troops.
He provided his troops with periodic respites to regain physical and emotional strength, and to scavenge for food.4 This served both to encourage
his troops and to facilitate the mission of conquering the Roman army
and acquiring more Roman territory.
In contrast, Alcibiades' influence over the Athenians led them to embark
on the ill-fated Sicilian Expedition. Alcibiades saw the conquest of Sicily
as the best means to accomplish Athenian grand strategy and extend their
influence because it used their strength—sea power.5 The endeavor failed,
however, because it lacked unity of command.6 The decision led Athens to
deviate from their grand strategy which had been to focus on Sparta, who
posed the greatest threat in terms of power and proximity, before extending their influence further. The deviation proved disastrous for the Athenians and weakened their capability to fight the Spartans. Hannibal's
actions, when compared with those of Alcibiades, demonstrate the difference that leadership makes in grand strategic outcomes.
Articulate communication that resonates with and inspires subordinates
and supporters alike is a second grand strategic principle that transcends
time and place. People weary from strenuous effort, fearful of daunting
challenges or threats that lie ahead, or unclear of the difference they can
make need motivation to complete their tasks. Soldiers are often in these
circumstances. Athenian, Spartan, Roman, Carthaginian, and contemporary commanders have all recognized this and inspired their troops with
motivational speeches prior to battle.
Wise leaders wanting to implement a successful grand strategy use communication to inspire, but also to direct. People cannot execute the
leader's plan nor take ownership of it if they do not understand the ends
or the general means by which the leader intends to reach the objectives.
They will not participate wholeheartedly unless it is clear how it is in their
self interest to do so and to help the team achieve the expressed goals.
With widespread public support for their grand strategy, leaders can
mobilize and direct the resources necessary to realize success; without it,
they will likely fail, even if they have made the proper estimate of the
enemy's situation and their own.7
The previous discussion indicates the power of domestic communication
between a leader and his people. Effective intergovernmental communication is another facet of successful grand strategy. The Debate at Sparta
and the Melian Dialogue are particularly instructive regarding diplomatic
communication. In the Debate at Sparta, the Corinthians demanded Spar2
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tan engagement against Athens, arguing that the Spartans had not lived
up to their commitments to the Allies. The Corinthian argument eventually convinced Sparta and they became involved in the war.8 During the
Melian Dialogue the Melians unsuccessfully attempted to sway Athens to
allow them to remain neutral. The Melians' failed efforts at moral persuasion and their refusal to side with Athens resulted in their ruin.9
Competent leadership and clear, persuasive communication are universally necessary principles of grand strategy. Although the implementation
of these principles will vary due to different times, regions, organization
types, or the technology available, abiding by these principles is important. Leaders who fail to successfully exercise these principles will not
achieve their goals. The same can be said of leveraging appropriate means
to accomplish desired ends. This maxim is at the core of the Clausewitzian
grand strategic approach.

Grand Strategy—Applying Clausewitz throughout
History
The Prussian general and strategist Carl von Clausewitz argued that "war
is merely the continuation of policy by other means."10 By this he meant
that war is one "instrument"11 available to leaders for accomplishing their
grand strategic ends, and that political objectives should precede military
ones.12 Clausewitz also argued that means must match their ends, and a
leader must not choose ends for which he does not have the means.13
Phillip II of Spain, Elizabeth I of England, and the Founding Fathers of
America understood this Clausewitzian "principle"14 to different degrees
and exercised it to varying levels of success.

Phillip II
Phillip II did not well apply the Clausewitzian concept of matching appropriate means to accomplish political ends. Phillip's grand strategy was to
restore Catholicism to England under his rule and increase the religion's
influence across Western Europe. Phillip believed God wanted to use him
to accomplish these goals. He saw himself as having special access to God
which enabled him to understand God's will better than others. Phillip
believed his divine connection guaranteed his success and so did not
make the necessary calculations and preparations to ensure success. He
did not ensure that his navy had the proper ammunition aboard each vessel to fit their cannons, nor enough of it to successfully defeat the British
Navy and conquer England. Phillip did not take seriously the logistical
requirements of food preparation for the journey and did not ensure that
3
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commanders' enforced the necessary discipline of eating the oldest food
first. Instead he impatiently sent his Navy off to war, "in the hope of a miracle,"15 before they had stockpiled enough food.
Phillip's inability to establish an efficient bureaucracy to process the voluminous paperwork from his field commanders was another failure that
prevented the realization of his grand strategy. His micromanagement
meant that his commanders did not have decentralized control to make
operational decisions necessary to ensure success. Instead they sought
guidance from Phillip, but often did not obtain a timely answer due to the
time lag associated with couriers and from Phillip's inefficient information processing. Despite having a more secure financial situation and a
stronger military than England, these failures and the friction16 caused by
bad weather and British actions contributed significantly to the rout of his
Armada by Elizabeth I and her Royal Navy. They also demonstrated that
while Phillip did subordinate military means to reach his political objective, he did not use the means necessary to successfully accomplish it.

Elizabeth I
Elizabeth I experienced greater success in her grand strategy than did
Phillip II because she applied the concepts that Clausewitz wrote about
years later. Her grand strategy was to strengthen England's position in
relation to Continental Europe, and to further Protestantism. One way
she did this was by remaining unmarried and by abstaining from wars
that did not suit England. By remaining unmarried and childless she was
able to exercise balance of power diplomacy17 without being drawn into
wars simply for dynastic reasons. As the leader of a relatively weak power,
Elizabeth's decision to avoid overstretching her nation was a wise
approach toward reaching her grand strategic ends.
A second way by which Elizabeth sought to accomplish her grand strategy
was through decentralized execution, but within guidelines that she set.
She directed Lord Howard, Sir Drake, and her other commanders to
"harass"18 the Spanish Armada, waiting for the time when the enemy was
vulnerable to decisively engage, the point Clausewitz referred to as the
"culminating point."19 This measure of freedom permitted her commanders to develop tactical and operational means to suit her strategic guidance. Operating under this freedom, Drake launched a preemptive raid in
1587 on the port at Cadiz, destroying enough ships to postpone the Spanish invasion by a year.20 The next year Drake and his superior, Lord
Howard, used fire-ships to terrorize the Spanish fleet and force them out
of Calais. This served as a turning point that, along with Spanish errors
and poor weather, led to English victory. Elizabeth's calculated and ratio4
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nal approach toward her grand strategy proved more successful than Phillip's and confirmed that she understood Clausewitz's principle of
determining her political aim and then matching means to accomplish it.

America's Founding Fathers
America's Founding Fathers understood and applied Clausewitz to their
grand strategy. Their broad purpose was to see if a government could last
without the force that a monarch imposes.21 Specifically, they believed the
best means of doing so was to turn the newly-independent American
states from a Confederation into a Union and a great power.22 Toward
these ends they sought economic growth and security, both internal and
external. A Union with a strong federal government offered the best
opportunity for success because it provided the greatest protection from
internal factions23 and from external threats.24 A Union also offered the
greatest hope for moving America from being a peripheral entity to a central power because it would enable Americans to pool the vast resources
available on the continent. They devised a constitution that addressed the
weaknesses in the Articles of Confederation and established a framework
for a stronger central government, capable of protecting all Americans
and establishing America as a formidable world power. Realizing that
they could not have the Union and abolish slavery, they made provisions
for slavery to remain legal for the time being, believing that the most
important thing was to form the Union; slavery could be addressed later.
To ensure ratification, Hamilton, Jay, and Madison laid out the reasoning
for the constitution and the formation of such a Union in the Federalist
Papers. Later, the Founding Fathers adopted a policy of avoiding entangling alliances25 to avoid engagement in unnecessary wars during America's formative years. These means helped preserve a strong Union and
contributed to America's rise as a global power. They also demonstrate
that the Founding Fathers adopted means consistent with their ends and
subordinated military pursuits to political interests.
Clausewitz remains relevant for statesmen today. Contemporary leaders
are wise to subordinate military considerations to the political objective
and to match ends with appropriate means when formulating and executing their grand strategy. President George H. W. Bush did this during the
first Gulf War in the early 1990s when he rallied the international community, formed a coalition, and drove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait—his
stated political objective—using the requisite military force, but not more
than was necessary. His son, President George W. Bush, experienced less
success waging the current Iraq War because he violated Clausewitzian
concepts. While he generally kept military considerations subject to the
political aim, he did not always apply appropriate means to reach his
5
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political goal. The failure to properly plan for the post-invasion tasks of
reconstruction and nation building was a classical example of taking "the
first step without considering the last"26 and led to errors in execution
and increased instability. As a result, Iraq has proven a painful reminder
that Clausewitz was right when he harped on the critical importance of
matching means to ends.

Grand Strategy and the Indirect Approach
As with policies based on Clausewitz, successful national leaders have also
utilized an indirect approach to accomplish their political objectives.27
Some practitioners of grand strategy have successfully employed it to
achieve their aims with lower financial and human costs than via a direct
approach. The indirect way contributed to a successful grand strategy
when its practitioners accurately accounted for their domestic situation,
their relative position in the international arena, and recent technological
developments.
Both Sun Tzu and B. H. Liddell Hart were theoretical proponents of
applying indirect approaches to the practice of grand strategy.28 Sun Tzu
wrote that the best war is the one you do not fight because you win
through diplomatic means, intelligence operations, or other indirect
methods.29 Hart, the great British strategist, defined the indirect way as
an "approach to the main enemy (that) was essentially ... through (their)
weakness to strength."30 The goal was to pit one's strengths, including a
variety of resources—even unconventional methods—against an enemy's
weaknesses, rather than meeting his strengths head on.
Hart thought the primary benefit of utilizing the indirect way was that it
left a nation better off after a war than before.31 British grand strategy
during World War I frustrated Hart because it deviated from what he
understood to be the country's traditional use of the indirect way to win
wars through mastery of the seas, a colonial empire rich in resources, and
financial support for continental allies who served as British proxies,
fighting decisive land battles. When Britain used the indirect way during a
war, it emerged relatively stronger because it stayed out of the fray and
allowed others to handle direct engagements and therefore suffer the
majority of the casualties. Britain did not use the indirect way in WWI and
was not better off after the war than before.
Successful use of the indirect approach involves more than simply asymmetrically leveraging assets against a foe. A leader must also have an
accurate understanding of the domestic and international situations in
6
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which he is operating. An improper evaluation of either can lead to failure. The Athenian leader, Pericles, is one example. Pericles failed to
understand the adverse impact his grand strategy would have on the
domestic morale of the Athenian people. Pericles adopted a defensive
posture in an attempt to demonstrate to the Spartans that Athens was
invincible and that frequent invasions were futile. Although his grand
strategy had operational merit, Pericles forgot to account for the emotional reaction of his people upon seeing the Spartans ravage their homeland. This miscalculation led to the ultimate failure of Pericles' grand
strategy.
As with Pericles, using an indirect approach does not inevitably lead to
success, nor does using a direct approach inevitably lead to failure. Hannibal experienced tremendous operational success despite using a direct
approach, capitalizing on superior tactics and intelligence to win decisive
battles at the time and place of his choosing. In the end, though, he was
unable to force the Romans to accept his terms of peace. Although it is
impossible to know for sure whether indirect methods would have been
more successful, the result of Hannibal's grand strategy illustrate the difficulty of gaining victory by directly attacking a formidable foe and
extending one's logistical support over many miles and difficult terrain.
Napoleon's foray into Russia likewise demonstrated the near impossibility of such an international undertaking, made even more difficult by an
enemy utilizing indirect means to further his forces' attrition.
Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt demonstrated a keen understanding of the indirect approach as grand strategic practitioners and
partners during WWII. Churchill accurately recognized that his position
vis-à-vis the Germans was weak. Because he knew that Britain could not
win the war on its own, he actively courted the American President to join
the war effort. The British Prime Minister simultaneously mobilized his
own limited resources to maintain the fight against Nazi Germany until he
could win the full support of allies, especially the Americans, and by so
doing tip the balance in his favor. Meanwhile, Roosevelt utilized the indirect way to move the U.S. toward actual entrance into the war. He incrementally moved America toward war by gradually increasing its material
support for the Allied cause. From moral support in the Atlantic Charter
to Lend Lease, Roosevelt supported Churchill but without getting too far
ahead of his domestic support base. After Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt could
enter the war with the support of the American people, but he still exercised leadership as a grand strategist, adopting a 'Europe first' approach
when the country was fixated on Japan.

7

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 3, No. 2

Journal of Strategic Security

In the end, American support enabled Churchill to bridge the time gap
until America actually entered the war. In the meantime, Churchill's
emphasis on gaining air superiority enabled Britain to distance itself from
Germany and survive until American (and Soviet) troops joined the war
effort. Churchill's ability to envision and shape the big picture by utilizing
means commensurate with his ends,32 including an indirect approach,
contributed to his success in navigating English grand strategy.
The post-WWII world also contains several examples of grand strategists
successfully employing the indirect approach. George Kennan's strategy
of containment proved to be complementary to the Marshall Plan and a
successful indirect approach to limiting Soviet influence in Europe during
the Cold War. President Reagan used increased defense spending, rhetoric, and diplomacy as indirect means to cause the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Although the American military was directly engaged in Desert
Shield and Desert Storm, Bush Senior successfully employed indirect
methods by using the UN to build a unified coalition to share the financial
costs and military involvement in the Persian Gulf War and to increase its
legitimacy.
In each case these post-WWII grand strategists bridged the gap between
setting and realizing their political objectives by using indirect methods as
part of their means. Doing so enabled them to accomplish their goals with
less loss of life and potentially less financial strain. They were successful
not just because they used the indirect way, but because they could count
on the support of their country as they implemented their grand strategy.
They were also successful because they adapted their grand strategy to the
technological developments of the nuclear age and, in accordance with
Clausewitz, used means commensurate with their ends.

Conclusion
President Obama appears to understand that effective grand strategy
involves weighing priorities. His speech on Afghanistan at West Point last
December demonstrated a commitment to disrupting, dismantling, and
defeating al-Qaida in South Asia, yet recognized that U.S. efforts there
were limited in scope, timeframe, and resources. America (at least under
his administration), would not subordinate its domestic, diplomatic, and
economic goals to the unlimited and unending pursuit of al-Qaida. This
admission is an initial indication that Obama understands the need to
subordinate military endeavors to his political objectives. It also shows
his grasp of the context in which he is operating, with respect to both his
domestic audience and the strategic geopolitical context in which he leads
8
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and operates. Time will tell whether he is able to bring his grand strategic
plans to fruition as it relates to economic recovery, an overhauled health
care plan, climate change, gaining international momentum toward
nuclear zero, bringing American involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan to a
successful, timely, and stable close, and protecting the homeland from
further terrorist attacks. As he attempts to do so, he will undoubtedly face
many more challenges. And, as he navigates these, Obama will do well to
apply the universal principles of grand strategy and Clausewitzian and
indirect approaches wherever possible.
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